My research is at the intersection of Ethics and Philosophy of Mind, in particular in Moral Psychology, Philosophy of Psychiatry, and Philosophical Psychology.
'Self-Deception in and out of Illness: Are some subjects responsible for their delusions?' in Self-knowledge in and outside of Illness, Sherrilyn Roush and Tuomas Pernu, eds., Palgrave Communications. 2017.
Poster based on 'Self-Deception in and out of Illness' on Thursday June 29th at the 2017 meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, MD.
Papers Under Review
'Self-Deception as Omission'
Work In Progress
'Addiction as Desensitizing Vulnerability: A framework for excuse'
'In Defense of Conditional Forgiveness'
Dissertation: On the Fringes of Moral Responsibility: Skepticism, self-deception, addiction, and delusion
My dissertation is a collection of essays under the theme of moral responsibility 'at the margins'. I begin with a chapter defending and developing a theory of morally responsible agency (a version of so-called 'reasons responsiveness' theories). In the second chapter I develop and defend a novel philosophical account of self-deception which both addresses difficulties present in competing views and makes sense of self-deception as an intentional phenomenon for which self-deceivers are responsible. In the third chapter I leverage my theory of self-deception to ask about the extent to which there is overlap between self-deception and clinical delusion. I conclude that there is a significant overlap, and that this sheds valuable light on the form of epistemic agency involved in the dynamics of delusion maintenance, and does so in such a way that allows responsibility judgements to get a toehold. In the fourth chapter I turn to addiction, appealing to results from the previous chapters to articulate a nuanced position concerning the extent to which addicts are morally responsible agents and the extent to which they share features with the self-deceived.