My research is at the intersection of ethics and philosophy of mind, in particular in moral psychology, philosophy of psychiatry, and philosophical psychology. 


2017. 'Self-Deception in and out of Illness: Are some subjects responsible for their delusions?' in Self-knowledge in and outside of IllnessSherrilyn Roush and Tuomas Pernu, eds., Palgrave Communications, 3(15): 1-12

Blog post on Imperfect Cognitions on 'Self-deception in and out of Illness' here.

Upcoming Presentations

'Addiction as desensitizing vulnerability: A framework for excuse' at the Canadian Philosophical Association meeting, June 4-7, Université de Québec à Montréal 

'Monothematic delusions: An expressivist two-factor account' (joint work with Adam Bradley) at the 45th meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, July 9-11, University of Michigan

'Addiction as desensitizing vulnerability: A framework for excuse' at Philosophical Moral Psychology: An International Meeting of Classic and Empirically Informed Philosophy, July 22-25, Ludwig Maximilians University, Munich

Papers Under Review

'Self-deception as omission' (Draft here)

Work In Progress

'Addiction as desensitizing vulnerability: A framework for excuse'

'Monothematic delusions: An expressivist two-factor account (joint work with Adam Bradley)

Dissertation: On the Fringes of Moral Responsibility: Skepticism, self-deception, addiction, and delusion

My dissertation is a collection of essays under the theme of moral responsibility 'at the margins'. I begin with a chapter defending and developing a theory of morally responsible agency (a version of so-called 'reasons responsiveness' theories). In the second chapter I develop and defend a novel philosophical account of self-deception which both addresses difficulties present in competing views and makes sense of self-deception as an intentional phenomenon for which self-deceivers are responsible. In the third chapter I leverage my theory of self-deception to ask about the extent to which there is overlap between self-deception and clinical delusion. I conclude that there is a significant overlap, and that this sheds valuable light on the form of epistemic agency involved in the dynamics of delusion maintenance, and does so in such a way that allows responsibility judgements to get a toehold. In the fourth chapter I turn to addiction, appealing to results from the previous chapters to articulate a nuanced position concerning the extent to which addicts are morally responsible agents and the extent to which they share features with the self-deceived.