My research is at the intersection of ethics and philosophy of mind, in particular in moral psychology, philosophy of psychiatry, and philosophical psychology.
‘Rationalism, Optimism, and the Moral Mind’ forthcoming in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
2017. 'Self-Deception in and out of Illness: Are some subjects responsible for their delusions?' in Self-knowledge in and outside of Illness, Sherrilyn Roush and Tuomas Pernu, eds., Palgrave Communications, 3(15): 1-12
Blog post on Imperfect Cognitions on 'Self-deception in and out of Illness' here.
‘Monothematic delusions: as expressivist two-factor account’ (joint work with Adam Bradley) at the inaugural meeting of the Australasian Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Macquarie University, Sydney, December 5-7
‘Monothematic delusions: as expressivist two-factor account’ (joint work with Adam Bradley) at the APA Eastern division, January 7-10, 2019, New York City
‘Self-deception as Omission’ at the analytic philosophy forum, October 25th, Shandong University, Jinan, China
'Addiction as desensitizing vulnerability: A framework for excuse' at the Canadian Philosophical Association meeting, June 4-7, Université de Québec à Montréal
'Monothematic delusions: An expressivist two-factor account' (joint work with Adam Bradley) at the 45th meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, July 9-11, University of Michigan
'Addiction as desensitizing vulnerability: A framework for excuse' at Philosophical Moral Psychology: An International Meeting of Classic and Empirically Informed Philosophy, July 22-25, Ludwig Maximilians University, Munich
Papers Under Review
'Self-deception as omission' (Draft here)
Work In Progress
'Addiction as desensitizing vulnerability: A framework for excuse'
'Monothematic delusions: An expressivist two-factor account (joint work with Adam Bradley)
Dissertation: On the Fringes of Moral Responsibility: Skepticism, self-deception, addiction, and delusion
My dissertation is a collection of essays under the theme of moral responsibility 'at the margins'. I begin with a chapter defending and developing a theory of morally responsible agency (a version of so-called 'reasons responsiveness' theories). In the second chapter I develop and defend a novel philosophical account of self-deception which both addresses difficulties present in competing views and makes sense of self-deception as an intentional phenomenon for which self-deceivers are responsible. In the third chapter I leverage my theory of self-deception to ask about the extent to which there is overlap between self-deception and clinical delusion. I conclude that there is a significant overlap, and that this sheds valuable light on the form of epistemic agency involved in the dynamics of delusion maintenance, and does so in such a way that allows responsibility judgements to get a toehold. In the fourth chapter I turn to addiction, appealing to results from the previous chapters to articulate a nuanced position concerning the extent to which addicts are morally responsible agents and the extent to which they share features with the self-deceived.